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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This short paper aims to contribute to the 
debate on the causes and remedies for high rates of 
unemployment and under-employment, which presently 
afflict large parts of both the North (industrial 
countries) and the South (developing countries).  
The starting point for the paper is a recent 
interesting and thoughtful examination of these 
questions by Isabelle Grunberg (1996).  As against 
the emphasis on labour market flexibility and the 
concept of NAIRU, which dominate the mainstream 
theoretical discussions, as well as policy 
prescriptions for the global unemployment problem, 
Grunberg provides an unorthodox analysis.  She 
regards failure on the demand side to be the main 
cause of unemployment and considers a range of 
structural factors connected with the increasing 
integration of the world economy (in terms of 
trade, finance and investment) which inhibit demand 
growth. 
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The present author broadly agrees with 
Grunberg's general approach.  This paper 
supplements her analysis by examining further some 
of the main themes presented in her contribution.  
Specifically, the paper will comment on the 
following issues: 
 
(a) The differences in the nature of the 
employment challenge which confronts industrial and 
developing countries. 
(b) The question of "jobless growth" and the 
effects of technical change on employment and 
unemployment. 
(c) The impact of globalisation and 
liberalisation on the rate of growth of demand in 
the world economy. 
 
The paper provides inter alia an analysis of 
the chief constraints on the demand as well as the 
supply side which may affect the long-term growth 
of output and employment in industrial and 
developing countries. 
 
 
II. THE EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE: NORTH AND SOUTH 
 
The main stylised facts about unemployment, 
under-employment and related phenomena in developed 
and developing economies may be summarised as 
follows.  
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1. There has been a large trend increase in 
unemployment rates in most industrial countries 
since 1973.  In 1970 there were 8 million people 
unemployed in OECD countries; in 1994 the 
unemployed numbered 35 million, about 10% of the 
labour force.   The rise in unemployment has been 
particularly marked in the case of West European 
countries.  West Germany provides a striking 
example of this.  It is a remarkable fact that 
between 1964 and 1973 the average rate of 
unemployment in West Germany was less than 1% of 
the labour force.  The corresponding unemployment 
rate for the last ten years (i.e. 1986-1995) has 
been over 8% of the labour force.    
 
2. In addition to these high recorded rates 
of unemployment, a considerable proportion of the 
workforce in advanced economies is presently 
obliged to work part-time, or is too discouraged by 
the lack of employment opportunities to look for 
work at all.  If these involuntary part time and 
discouraged workers are included, it is estimated 
that this would raise the OECD unemployment rate by 
half as much (OECD (1994)). 
 
3. Unemployment rates have been appreciably 
lower in the U.S. than in Western Europe.  Between 
1964 and 1973, the U.S. unemployment rate averaged 
4.5%. During the last ten years (1986 to 1995), it 
has been higher (6.4%), but not as high as in 
Western Europe.   
 
4 
 
 Despite this superior U.S. performance 
relative to Western Europe in relation to open 
unemployment, the U.S. nevertheless has a large 
army of underemployed people.  Thurow (1996, p.56) 
observes: 
 
 “There are 8.1 million American workers in 
temporary jobs, 2 million who work ‘on call’ and 8.3 
million self-employed ‘independent contractors’ (many of 
whom are down-sized professionals who have very few 
clients but call themselves self-employed consultants 
because they are too proud to admit that they are 
unemployed).  Most of these more than 18 million people 
are looking for more work and better jobs.  Together 
these contingent workers account for 14 percent of the 
workforce.” 
 
 Moreover, the average real wage for non-
supervisory workers in the U.S. declined at a rate 
of 0.3% per annum in the 1970s, 1.0% per annum in 
the 1980s and 0.3% per annum between 1990 to 1994.  
In contrast in the 1960s, the corresponding average 
real wage rose at a rate of 1.4% per annum (Pollin 
& Zahrt, 1996).  
 
 Further, in addition to the huge 
underemployment and stationary or declining real 
wages, another unfavourable aspect of the labour 
market experience in the U.S. in the recent period 
has been the growing inequality of wages.  Wage 
dispersion had decreased in the U.S. during the 
1950s and 1960s but wages have become much more 
unequal during the last two decades. Wage 
dispersion has also greatly increased in the UK 
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over the last fifteen years. However in continental 
Western Europe there has been very little change in 
the recent period. 
 
4. The unemployment challenge facing 
developing countries today is somewhat different 
from that which confronts the advanced countries. 
Since in developing countries, there is hardly any 
public provision or welfare payments for those who 
become unemployed, most people in these countries 
are obliged to seek work, howsoever unremunerative 
it may be.  Consequently, the recorded rates of 
unemployment in developing countries tend to be 
generally low.  This may be illustrated by the case 
of Mexico. Mexico, although still a developing 
country, joined the OECD - the rich countries’ club 
- in the wake of the euphoria following its entry 
into NAFTA. At a time of large scale unemployment 
in industrial countries, it turns out that the 
country with one of the lowest unemployment rates 
in the OECD is Mexico - its recorded unemployment 
rate was 2.9 percent in 1992, 3.5 percent in 1993 
and 3.7 per cent in 1994 compared with double digit 
rates in several European economies.  
 
 The employment problem in the South thus 
manifests itself primarily in the forms of 
underemployment and low productivity/low 
remuneration work, often called ‘disguised 
unemployment’, following Joan Robinson. More 
significantly, however, the labour force in the two 
developing continents with the most acute employment 
difficulties, namely Latin America and Africa, is 
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presently increasing at a rate of approximately 3% 
per annum.  The employment challenge before these 
countries is therefore not only to reduce the 
existing large disguised unemployment, but also to 
provide adequately remunerative jobs for the rapidly 
growing new entrants to the labour force.  {PRIVATE 
} 
 
5. Since the 1980’s, there has also been 
differences in the experiences of  Asian countries 
on the one hand,  and Latin American and African 
countries on the other hand.  Between 1980 and 1992 
paid employment in Latin American countries, for 
example, fell at a rate of 0.1% per annum (ILO, 
1995).  This reversed the trend of the previous 
three decades, which had witnessed a significant 
expansion of modern sector employment. Again, the 
case of Mexico provides a good illustration. Between 
1990 and 1992, the economically active population 
(EAP) in that country is estimated to have increased 
by 1.2 million persons each year. However, during 
this period only 339,974 jobs, i.e. 28 per cent of 
the EAP, was absorbed by the formal labour market. 
Yet it is important to observe that in the two years 
before the debt crisis, 1980 and 1981, the Mexican 
economy was expanding at an average rate of about 
seven per cent per annum and creating almost three 
quarters of a million new jobs each year in the 
formal sector.
1
 
 
                                                          
     1
See Singh (1988) and Peters (1994). 
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 In sharp contrast to these serious employment 
difficulties of the African and Latin American 
economies, there has been a fast expansion of formal 
sector employment in East and South East Asian 
countries. In a number of these countries (e.g. 
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia), manufacturing employment 
increased during the 1980s at a rate of almost 6% 
per annum.  These previous labour-surplus economies 
have found themselves with significant labour 
shortages, leading to considerable immigration of 
labour force from neighbouring lower income 
countries.   
 
 
III. GROWTH OF OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND REAL DEMAND 
 
How can these unfavourable developments in the 
labour markets in the North and in large parts of 
the South be explained? 
 
The key variable here is the growth of GDP.  
The outstanding record of near full employment in 
industrial countries for nearly a quarter of a 
century up to 1973 arose from the very fast growth 
of these economies during that period. In this aptly 
named golden age of capitalist development, GDP in 
industrial countries expanded at a historically 
unprecedented rate of nearly 5% per annum.
2
 This rate 
was almost twice as high as any of the trend rates 
experienced by these economies during their previous 
                                                          
     2
See further Glyn et al (1990); Kindelberger (1994); Singh 
(1995); Crafts and Toniolo (1996). 
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phases of development over the last 150 years.
3
 
However, since 1973 the GDP growth rate in OECD 
economies has fallen to approximately half of what 
it was during the 1950s and 60s, resulting in the 
observed high rates of unemployment or under-
employment. Similarly, the reason for the superior 
employment performance of East Asian countries 
relative to those in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa lies in the much faster rate of growth of the 
former group of economies since 1980.  The East 
Asian countries have expanded at an average rate of 
nearly 8% per annum compared with average growth 
rates of 2 - 3% in the Latin American and African 
countries during this recent period.
4
 [see Table 1]. 
 
 
It is sometimes argued that economic growth no 
longer results in the expansion of employment.  
However there is little empirical support for this 
proposition at the macro-economic level in either 
industrial or developing countries.  The data for 
industrial countries in fact shows that the growth 
rate required before the economy starts creating net 
new jobs has been less in the period 1974 to 1995 
than during 1960 to 1973.  This reflects the lower 
average productivity growth of the later period.
5
  
                                                          
     3
  Maddison (1982) 
     4
For a comparative analysis of economic development of 
developing countries in different regions see further Singh (1993, 
1994a, 1995a); World Bank (1991, 1993), among others. 
     5
In the U.S., the annual growth rate required for the economy 
to start creating net additional jobs during 1960-1973 was 2.3%; 
between 1974-1995, the corresponding rate has only been 0.7%.  See 
further, ILO (1996). 
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Further, cross-section econometric evidence for 
advanced industrial countries suggests, if anything, 
an increase over time in the employment elasticity 
of output growth rather than a decrease, as the 
hypothesis of jobless growth would imply.
6
  The 
reason why unemployment or under-employment has 
increased so steeply in all these countries  is not 
that ‘growth’ does not create as many jobs as 
before, but that there has been much slower growth 
than before. 
 
Thus, a comparison of the record of growth of 
output, employment and earnings in the golden age 
with that observed for these variables in the 
subsequent period for the advanced industrial 
countries strongly suggests that with sufficiently 
fast economic growth, countries can achieve both 
full employment and rising real wages.  This is as 
true of the U.S. as of the West European countries.  
The available cross-section evidence for developing 
countries for the period since 1980 also 
unambiguously points in the same direction. As chart 
1 shows, the faster the economic growth in a 
developing region during the 1980s, the faster was 
the growth of manufacturing employment. Moreover, 
with fast economic growth, the East and South East 
Asian countries not only achieved fast growth of 
formal sector employment during the 1980s, the real 
wages in these countries rose at a rate of 5% per 
annum.  The Latin American and African countries not 
                                                          
     6
Boltho and Glyn (1995) report that employment elasticity of 
GDP growth for advanced industrial countries rose from 0.49% 
during 1975-82 to 0.63% during 1982-93. 
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only had a decline in modern sector employment, but 
also suffered reduced and stagnant real wages (this 
point is discussed further below). 
 
This brings us to the central question: can 
the growth rates of advanced industrial countries 
be raised to the levels required to attain full 
employment with rising real wages as was, for 
example, the case in the golden age?   Similarly, 
one can ask: can developing countries in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa achieve the growth 
rates which would be necessary to provide jobs to 
their fast-growing labour forces as well as reduce 
the large backlog of existing open and disguised 
unemployment?  The essential argument of this paper 
is that there is in principle an affirmative answer 
to each of these questions.  This argument will be 
elaborated in the next two sections by examining 
separately for advanced and developing countries 
the various possible constraints on the demand as 
well as the supply side, which may be inimical to 
faster long-term economic growth . 
 
 
IV.  THE CONSTRAINTS ON FASTER ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
  ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
 
The Record of the Golden Age: The Social Market 
Economy 
 
The first important point to note is that 
although the growth performance of advanced 
industrial countries in the period since 1973 is 
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considerably inferior to that of the golden age, it 
is very much in line with the historical record of 
these economies.  That does not make the post-1973 
record legitimate or acceptable in view of the high 
degree of unemployment which presently exists.  
Nevertheless it does suggest that it is the high 
growth rates of the golden age which are the 
exception, rather than the rates of the recent 
period. 
 
Why were the growth rates so high in the 
golden age?  Does that period of high employment 
and rapidly rising living standards have any 
implications for the contemporary situation in 
industrial countries?  As these questions have been 
examined at length elsewhere(see Singh, 1995) , it 
will suffice to summarise here the main points of 
the analysis. 
 
(1) The outstanding performance of 
industrial countries in the period 1950-73 was not 
an accident, or simply a favourable outcome of a 
chance combination of circumstances.  It derived 
from an economic model which was rather different 
from that which prevailed in the inter-war period 
or since the 1980s.   
 
(2) In descriptive macro-economic terms, the 
golden age was characterised by exceptionally high 
rates of growth of real demand and investment.  
Aggregate real demand in industrial countries 
increased at a rate of nearly 5% per annum, 
compared for example with the post-1973 growth of 
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this variable at about half that rate.  Similarly, 
during the golden age, capital stock and capital 
labour ratio in these countries recorded an 
unprecedented growth. These in turn generated high 
growth rates of productivity and output, justifying 
past investment and encouraging its continuation in 
a positive feedback loop. 
 
(3) At a deeper economic level, this high 
growth equilibrium of the golden age was sustained 
by new institutional arrangements - indeed a new 
economic system.  This system arose in Western 
European countries in the post-war period in 
response (a) to the mass unemployment of the Great 
Depression and equally importantly (b) the 
confrontation between alternative socio-economic 
orders (i.e. the communist party-led command 
economy of the former Soviet Union and the liberal 
capitalistic economic system of the U.S.).  This 
new social market economy was based on cooperative 
relationships between employees, employers and the 
government at the national level and between nation 
states at the international level. Within nations, 
it involved a social consensus, a national 
compromise over the distribution of income and the 
fruits of economic progress.  The central elements 
of this compromise were a commitment to full 
employment and a welfare state on the part of the 
employers and the government, and a corresponding 
commitment to wage moderation on the side of the 
employees.  At the international level, following 
the war, the world trade and financial system 
worked in a stable and predictable way under the 
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hegemony of the U.S., the dominant economic power 
for most of this period. 
 
An analysis of the reasons for the fall of the 
golden age by the mid-1970s and the emergence of a 
rather different economic system in the 1980s is 
provided by Glyn et al. (1990).   It suffices here 
to note that the new post-1980 economic order, 
which has progressed most in the U.S. and the U.K., 
emphasises the supremacy of market forces; it 
eschews government regulation of labour, product or 
capital markets, as well as non-market cooperative 
relationships between governments, employees and 
employers such as ‘incomes policies’.  Similarly, 
at the international level, instead of cooperation 
between nation states, economic relationships are 
increasingly dominated by market forces unleashed 
by liberalisation and globalisation.  The extent, 
if any, to which this new economic order constrains 
the current and potential growth of output in 
industrial countries will be examined later. 
 
 
Technology and Unemployment  
 
Turning to supply side constraints on GDP 
growth in industrial countries, the question of the 
nature and pace of technological change is clearly 
salient. There are two inter-related issues here: 
 
(a)  Is the pace of technical change now 
faster than before, and thus directly responsible 
for the observed increase in unemployment? 
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(b) How does technical change affect the 
potential growth of output? 
  
The most important technical change of the 
post-war period is undoubtedly the information and 
communications technology revolution (ICT).  Many 
students of technology regard ICT to be on par with 
the previous major technical revolutions of the 
last two centuries such as the steam engine and 
electricity.   However, ICT differs from the latter 
two in one important respect.  In addition to being 
an input and facilitating production in a wide 
range of industries, the ICT also has direct 
outputs, in the form of new products - e.g. the 
Internet, CD-ROM, micro-processors, etc.  Another 
important difference between ICT and electricity 
and steam power is that the pace of technical 
change in the former has been much faster with the 
result that its price has fallen far more quickly 
relative to the other two.  Whereas it took almost 
fifty years for the price of electricity or of 
steam power to be halved after the beginning of 
their commercial use, the price of ICT has fallen 
to a fiftieth of what it was twenty-five years ago.  
An ordinary PC today costing about $2,000 has as 
much computing power as the most advanced computer 
in 1975 costing at the time over $10 million 
(Woodall, 1996). 
 
Nevertheless, despite its potential, the ICT 
has not resulted in a faster average growth of 
productivity in industrial economies.  The rate of 
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productivity growth in the OECD countries has been 
considerably lower in the period 1974-1995 than 
during the 1950s and 60s.  This outstanding fact 
has two major implications.  First of all, it 
suggests that the mass unemployment of the recent 
period cannot be blamed on technology.  The 
observed fall in productivity growth suggests a 
lower average rate of technical change rather than 
an increase.   A part of the paradox may well be 
due to the incorrect measurement of output and 
productivity in the recent period in the national 
accounting statistics as some economists, probably 
rightly, suggest.  However, an important part of 
the answer to this paradox of a huge new technical 
revolution and yet no increase in average 
productivity clearly lies in the fact that the 
potential of this technology is not yet being fully 
realised.  If the rate of growth of real aggregate 
demand was higher, this technology would have more 
widespread use in most branches of industry and 
services, reducing their prices and, as in the case 
of previous technical revolutions, leading to a 
virtuous circle of increased demand, increased 
output and increased growth of productivity.  In 
short, the unutilised potential of the ICT 
revolution suggests that the rate of growth of GDP 
in industrial countries is certainly not 
constrained by supply.  If there are constraints, 
it is to the factors on the demand side that we 
must turn. 
 
The Mainstream View: NAIRU and Flexible Labour 
Markets 
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However, contrary to the above analysis, many 
mainstream economists normally insist that the 
chief constraints on employment and GDP growth in 
advanced economies lie on the supply rather than 
the demand side.   The most important argument made 
in this respect is that labour market 
inflexibilities constrain output and employment 
growth well before full employment is reached.  The 
formal analysis is conducted in terms of the 
concept of NAIRU, the Non-Accelerating Inflation 
Rate of Unemployment. There are, however, many 
well-known difficulties with the NAIRU analysis, 
both at the empirical and analytical levels. I 
simply note here that the labour market theories of 
unemployment and inflation cannot explain the long-
term pattern in these variables in leading 
industrial countries. To illustrate, the labour 
markets were much more flexible in the 1930s 
compared with the 1960s, and yet the 1930s had mass 
unemployment (and low inflation) and the 1960s had 
full employment and also low inflation.  Contrary 
to the NAIRU analysis, real product wages rose more 
in the 1960s than they did in the 1930s and yet 
there was fuller employment in the later period 
than in the earlier one. 
  
The exponents of NAIRU set great store by the 
recent employment experiences of the U.S. and 
Western Europe.  It is argued that the main reason 
why the U.S. today has lower unemployment than 
Western Europe is because of its relatively much 
more flexible labour markets. This argument, 
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however, fails to take into account the fact that 
the U.S. had more flexible labour markets than 
Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s as well.  In 
the earlier period, European countries enjoyed a 
far superior employment record to that of the U.S. 
 
As suggested before, the missing variable in 
the above analysis is the rate of growth of real 
demand and output.  The main reason for the 
superior employment record of the European 
countries in the golden age compared with either 
the interwar period or the 1980s, was the much 
faster growth of real demand and output in that 
period. 
 
The emphasis above, and indeed, throughout 
this paper, on real demand is deliberate. It points 
to the fact that the "demand problem" today cannot 
simply be solved by normal expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policy. The post World War II economic 
history of industrial countries suggests that 
unless there is a restraining institutional 
mechanism with respect to wages and incomes, 
monetary and fiscal expansion will simply lead to 
an increase in money demand rather than real demand 
as the economy moves towards fuller employment on a 
sustained basis. This suggests that a main 
constraint on the growth of real demand is an 
institutional one: the absence of income and wage 
coordination policies which were an important part 
of the golden age consensus. 
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It might parenthetically be noted that 
although there is some common ground between the 
NAIRU analysis and that outlined above, there are 
also profound differences both with respect to the 
overall analytical perspective and policy 
conclusions.  Instead of recommending greater 
labour market flexibility in order to increase 
employment (through measures such as reducing trade 
union rights or cutting welfare state benefits), 
the present paper emphasises the role of the growth 
of real demand through non-market, co-operative and 
collective institutional mechanisms. 
 
Liberalisation, Globalisation and the Demand 
Constraint 
 
In addition to the absence of the domestic 
institutional mechanisms which can constrain real 
demand growth as outlined above, there are also 
today other important constraints on demand growth 
at the international level. The latter emanate from 
the liberalisation of national economies, and the 
globalisation of markets, which has occurred in the 
last 10 to 15 years.  A very important part of this 
process in the present context is the free movement 
of capital across the exchanges for most industrial 
countries and, increasingly, for many developing 
economies. 
 
In contemplating the shape of a liberal 
international economy in the post-war period, 
Keynes was most concerned with the problem of how 
the balance of payments disequilibria between 
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nations may be resolved at a rate of growth of 
world demand which was adequate for full 
employment.  He noted that:  
 
 “the problem of maintaining equilibrium in the 
balance of payments between countries has never been 
solved... the failure to solve this problem has been a 
major cause of impoverishment and social discontent and 
even wars and revolutions ...to suppose that there 
exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of 
adjustment which preserves equilibrium if only we trust 
matters of laissez faire is a doctrinaire delusion which 
disregards the lessons of historical experience without 
having behind it the support of sound theory.” 
(Moggridge, Vol. 25, pp.21-22) 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions were designed 
to cope with this problem.  During the golden age, 
notwithstanding their many weaknesses, these 
institutions, with active help from favourable US 
government policies (eg. the Marshall Plan), were 
able to ensure that balance of payments 
disequilibria were indeed resolved at high rates of 
growth.  However, following the demise of the 
Bretton Woods regime, the payments equilibria 
between countries under financial liberalisation 
has only been maintained at low rates of growth of 
real world demand.  In addition to this important 
factor, there are also other ways in which the 
current liberalised and globalised international 
economic regime can, and has, constrained aggregate 
demand.  
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Firstly, individual industrial countries have 
been obliged by financial markets to follow 
generally restrictive economic policies, because 
expansionary policies are punished by the markets 
and become unviable. In the formation of average 
market opinion, far more weight is given to the 
perceived dangers of inflation rather than to the 
need to obtain full utilisation of resources. 
Eatwell (1995) outlines a process by which such 
market psychology becomes predominant. 
 
Secondly, unfettered capital movements provide 
enormous scope for destabilising speculation which 
in turn leads to high volatility of financial 
variables such as exchange rates and the nominal 
rate of interest. These in turn can affect real 
variables such as investment both directly and 
indirectly. Investment is discouraged directly by 
the rising cost of capital which is in part caused 
by volatility in financial variables. In addition, 
the greater overall uncertainty which now 
increasingly characterises the economic environment 
as well as the bigger fluctuations in almost all 
the components of final demand also have a negative 
effect on the corporate inducement to invest. The 
net result of all these factors is the observed low 
rates of growth of aggregate demand, output and 
employment.   
 
V. LABOR MARKETS AND GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Developing country labour markets 
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Turning to developing countries, the first 
important point to note is that it would be 
difficult to explain the serious employment 
situation and the reductions in real wages in Latin 
American and African countries during the last 15 
years in terms of the rigidities of their labour 
markets.  In static terms, there may well be many 
rigidities and imperfections in these markets, but 
it is important to appreciate that the experience 
of this period indicates that over time, these 
markets have responded well and quickly to economic 
changes.  Real wages, for example, fell by as much 
as fifty per cent in countries like Mexico during 
the economic downturn of the 1980s and rose 
somewhat in the subsequent upturn.  In other words, 
labour markets have been flexible in a dynamic 
sense. 
 
Moreover, aggregate cross-section data on real 
earnings and employment for the developing regions 
do not provide any support for the labour market 
theories of employment.  In Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa there were enormous falls in real 
earnings in the 1980s: of the order of more than 
ten per cent per annum in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
over three per cent per annum in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (see Table 2). As seen earlier, these 
large reductions in real earnings did not, however, 
lead to an improvement in the employment situation, 
but rather to a deterioration. In contrast, in the 
East Asian countries, there was a phenomenal 
increase in real wages - at a rate of over 5 per 
cent per annum.  Yet this growth of earnings was 
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accompanied, as noted before, by a large increase 
in modern sector employment.  In fact, in many of 
the East Asian countries, there were significant 
labour shortages which were met by immigration from 
abroad. 
 
The essential reason why both real wages and 
employment expanded in East Asia, whilst both fell 
in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, lies in 
the differences in the real rates of growth of 
aggregate demand and output for countries on the 
three continents.  The Latin American and African 
economies became severely balance-of-payments 
constrained during the 1980s as a consequence of 
the debt crisis and therefore could maintain only 
low rates of growth of real aggregate demand and 
production.  The East Asian economies escaped the 
debt crisis and were thereby able to maintain their 
previous high rates of growth of real demand and 
GDP (Singh, 1993; 1994a). 
 
 
Constraints on the South's economic growth 
 
The above analysis leads us finally to the 
question whether developing countries in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa can achieve in 
future the growth rates required to provide jobs to 
the new entrants to the labour force as well as 
reduce the current backlog of unemployment and 
under-employment.  Econometric studies suggest that 
in order to be able to employ a labour force which 
is growing at a rate of 3 per cent per annum, at 
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the existing wage rates, a developing economy would 
have to grow at about 6 per cent per annum. 
 
At one level, the answer to the question as to 
whether Latin American countries can achieve such 
growth rates is straightforward.  They have 
recorded such growth rates in the not too distant 
past - between 1950 and 1980. There is no reason at 
all why, at least on the supply side, they should 
not be able to achieve similar or higher growth 
rates in years to come.  
 
However, the situation is more complex.  In 
the recent period, the Latin American countries 
have been following the Washington Consensus and 
have been enthusiastically liberalising their 
economies. They have unilaterally greatly reduced 
their tariffs and liberalised their financial 
regimes in order to attract foreign capital, which 
they duly did.  Spurred by the euphoria about the 
Washington Consensus and the emerging markets, as 
well as by other factors, Latin American countries 
received enormous inflows of funds between 1990 and 
1994, largely from U.S. institutional investors.   
These funds relaxed the foreign exchange constraint 
and enabled many Latin American countries to resume 
the process of real economic growth after the "lost 
decade" of the 1980s. 
 
As Rodrik (1994) and Krugman (1995) point out, 
however, these portfolio flows to Latin America 
were not responding to fundamentals but represented 
a misplaced euphoria and a 'herd' instinct.  The 
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market was not rewarding virtue, frugality and 
restraint, but in many countries subsidising 
consumption at the expense of investment.  Despite 
evidence that countries like Mexico were running 
huge current account deficits and using inflows 
largely for current consumption, such flows 
continued.  The Mexican trade balance shifted from 
a small surplus in 1988 to a deficit of US $20 
billion in 1993; the current account deficit was 
about 6% of GDP in 1993 and 9% in 1994.  Financial 
and trade liberalisation policies led to a fall in 
private savings from roughly 15% to 5% of GDP 
despite high interest rates (Taylor and Piper, 
1996).  Notwithstanding huge capital inflows in the 
1990s, Mexico's rate of economic growth during 
1990-94 was only 2.5% p.a. - barely equal to the 
rate of population growth. 
 
  The speculative bubble burst in December 1994, 
when portfolio flows to Mexico suddenly stopped. 
Share prices fell sharply, not only in Mexico but 
also, through the “contagion effect”, in most 
emerging markets. The impact on the real economy 
was devastating – real GDP fell by 7% in Mexico and 
by 5% in Argentina. Thus, even when financial 
markets have been expansionary, their bandwagon and 
herd characteristics generate considerable 
instability for the real economy.  
 
 Consequently, under the Washington consensus 
policies, the real economy of Latin American 
countries expanded at a very low rate – 3 to 3.5 
percent per annum – in the 1990s. Singh (1996) has 
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suggested that the basic difficulty lies in the 
fact that the Latin American countries opened up 
too much and too suddenly to the international 
economy, both in the financial and product markets, 
so as to be able to sustain a desired current 
account position at the socially necessary growth 
rate of 6% or so per annum. Instead of a 
doctrinaire pursuit of more or less free trade and 
virtually unimpeded capital flows, Singh proposes a 
set of pragmatic policies to assist the Latin 
American real economy. These policies involve, 
inter alia, a considerable regulation of external 
capital flows, but also a relatively modest degree 
of control over imports. Unfettered capital markets 
and unrestricted trade liberalisation would not 
appear to represent the optimal degree of openness 
for most Latin American economies at the present 
juncture.  
 
   Finally, unlike the Latin American economies, 
in the case of the African countries, supply side 
constraints on economic growth are more plausible. 
Although they are constrained by their balance of 
payment position (in turn attributable in 
considerable measure to low commodity prices), 
there are also in these countries serious supply 
side problems, not least those of governance and 
infrastructure. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
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    The essential argument of this paper has been 
that  unemployment in the North and in large parts 
of the South is due to a trend reduction in the rate 
of growth of output in these economies during the 
last two decades or so. The solution, therefore, 
must entail a restoration of economic growth in the 
North to its golden age levels, and growth in the 
Latin American countries to their long-term trend 
rates of 1950-1980. This should go a long way 
towards fully addressing the employment deficits in 
these economies on a sustained basis. Moreover, it 
is argued here that such growth is perfectly 
feasible on the supply side. Not only are there 
unutilized human resources, but also, significantly, 
there is a huge backlog of technology in the form of 
the information and communications technology 
revolution, whose full potentials are far from being 
realised. 
 
The central constraint on fast economic growth 
in the world economy is therefore not failure on the 
supply side, but on the demand side. To that extent, 
it is a self-inflicted wound, arising from the 
inefficiencies or the absence of the appropriate 
coordinating economic mechanisms. The paper suggests 
that in order to achieve the required rates of 
growth of real demand (to attain the desired output 
and employment objectives) deep institutional 
changes will be necessary, both at the national and 
international levels in the world community of 
nations.  
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  These institutional changes are analysed and 
examined at length in Singh (1995).To summarize, 
what is required at the international level is for 
governments to agree to (a) give chief priority to 
the employment problem; (b) symmetrical adjustment 
in deficit and surplus countries; (c) macro-economic 
policy coordination, particulary between industrial 
countries via a multilateral mechanism. Originally 
this was the intended role of the IMF, instead of 
which it has mostly been used to discipline the 
South. 
 
  Parallel to these external coordinating 
mechanisms, and perhaps even more importantly, it is 
necessary to have appropriate mechanisms at the 
national level, to coordinate wage levels in  
leading industrial countries – rather than the 
current policies  which center around labour market 
flexibility and deregulation. Indeed, pay 
coordinating policies only work if they are not seen 
simply as mechanisms to reduce workers’ real wages 
to correct short-term macro-economic disequilibria, 
but are regarded as long run measures leading to a 
fair and more progressive income distribution over 
time.  
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Table 1 
 
Trends in GDP growth: regions and the world 
1965-1994 
(Average annual percentage growth) 
 
 
 1965-1980 1980-1990 1990-1994 
Low-income 
economies 
(excluding China 
and India) 
 
4.8 
 
2.9 
 
1.4 
Middle-income 
economies 
6.3 2.5 0.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.0 1.6 3.6 
South Asia 
(including India) 
4.2 2.1 0.9 
East Asia 
(including China) 
7.3 7.8 9.4 
All low- and 
middle-income 
economies 
5.9 3.2 1.9 
High income 
economies 
3.8 3.2 1.7 
   U.S. 2.7 3.3 2.5 
  Japan 6.6 4.0 1.2 
  Germany 3.3 1.9 1.1 
World 4.1 3.1 1.8 
  
Source: World Bank (1992, 1996). 
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Table 2: Real earnings in manufacturing  
 
Region Years Average annual rate 
of growth 
(percentage) 
Sub-Saharan Africa
a
 1975-80 -0.6 
 1980-88 -12.3 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
1971-80 -2.13 
 1981-92 -3.13 
East and South East 
Asia
b
 
1971-80 5.32 
 1981-90 5.12 
  Index manufacturing 
real earnings per 
employee (1987=100) 
South Asia
c
 1971 86.2 
 1980 87.4 
 1985 91.5 
 
Source: ILO (1995), ibid. 
 
                                                          
a
 Real annual earnings per employee in manufacturing, 1987 ($). 
b
 Comprises Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand. 
c
 Comprises Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
 
